ource: "Public Management", 2016 (2), 63-75.

Fan Yong-Mao, associated professor of Public Policy and Public Finance Institute affiliated to SPAP of Remin University of China.

Environmental management is an important manifestation of national governance capacity. However, in recent years, the frequent occurrence of pollution around the country highlighted the plight of China's environmental governance and the short board of national governance capacity. Of which, the most severe pollutions are air pollution represented in haze and water pollution represented in river pollution, which attract most attention from society and public. Characteristics of such pollution are pollutants flow directly or intersect across administrative regions.  Regional transport pollution become more and more obvious, and the pollution sources are separated from contaminated areas. The human life in administrative areas of pollution sources brought prominent negative external contradictions to administrative region of contaminated areas. Cross-border pollution problem is complex, extensive with hypothesis. Interest demands from different administrative body, economic body, and social groups intersect with each other, and environmental destroyer, beneficiaries and victims mixed with each other as well. Therefore, cross-border environmental problems have three characteristics cross administrative boundaries, long-term and multilevel nature of interest related subject, which directly related to the industrial structure and energy structure, industrial layout, development, tax structure. Its governance have several outstanding difficulties: First, resource ownership is not clear, when the resources of a region is destroyed, it is difficult to accurately determine the cost of damage, even fair to make a claim, thus resulting in "tragedy of the commons"; Second, the administrative border with border pollution is inconsistent, and the lack of effective carrier and platform for inter-regional cooperation; third, as a long-term governance, this contamination cannot be solved overnight, but long-term maintenance and compromise are necessary between relevant subjects; Fourth, interest related subject with multilevel natures ,interest related subjects of political nature, economic nature and social nature intersect with each other, and governors, polluters, impaired beneficiaries have complex relationships. Administrative division barriers, and different levels of economic development make cross-border environmental management relationship present complex and multi-level; Fifth, cross-border environment issue control needs multi-party cooperation. However, the cooperation is accompanied with "free riders" and "prisoner's Dilemma" and other issues caused by unequal sharing of costs and benefits, uneven implementation of penalties and incentives. There exist some limitations as well such as difficult coordination, high cost of collaboration, accountability dilemma, collaboration inert and collaboration paradox. How to suppress interest related subjects' desire, to encourage them to abide by the rules with efficient implementation, is relying on the executive order, price incentives, or incentive trust which is the key to the success of cooperation.

In summing up the characteristics of three element management mechanism- bureaucracy, contracts, and network, the paper proposed a three members fused in different proportions but each oriented cooperative governance model, that bureaucracy-led governance model , contract-oriented governance model and network-oriented governance With the growth of the market and the third-party organization, contract mechanism and networking mechanisms are embedded in different proportions in the bureaucratic mechanism. After embedded in the bureaucracy, contract mechanism and networking mechanisms bring different results. First, the bureaucratic power penetrating the contract, will rapidly change market selection in a short time, but cause long-term damage to the interest related subjects of the market which will refuse to cooperate, resulting in the intervention of the market. Second, the bureaucratic power to penetrate the network, the network will share the long-term relationship administration, resulting in the intervention of social groups. Third, the network relationship penetrating bureaucracy, increases or decreases the intensity of the trust to reduce transaction costs of implementing rules, and enhance the cooperation to achieve performance, establishing independent cooperative government alliance. Fourth, the contract penetrating the bureaucracy, enhances the force to support the rule, and improve the efficiency of cooperation, causing the government buy the property and shared interest compensation mechanism.

Based on the above theoretical model, as used herein, "APEC blue", the PRD air pollution control, Pan- Pearl River water pollution control, respectively, as a typical case under bureaucracy-led, market-led models and network-led. The study found, "APEC blue" belongs to typical bureaucratic mechanism dominant governance model, which is characterized by concentrating power for quick control, but there still exits obvious insufficiency of social participation and market regulation, regardless of the cost, the lack of interest compensation mechanism and so on. Under bureaucracy-led governance, government play a leading role, and pollution control process is excessively dependent on the government's power. “Single Centre” presented by governance and over administrative of control mechanism leading to cross-border interest coordination also enhance the unsustainability of this cooperation governance. In the case of lack of interest compensation mechanism, the huge cost of governance in many places will have a greater impact on the vulnerable local government or interest damaged market players will adopt active avoidance or even exit the cooperation. PRD air pollution control is typical contract dominant mechanism leading cooperative governance model. Contract mechanism is to utilize market prices to coordinate resources and information related to the subject, so as to realize incentive compatibility, to enhance the power of cooperation. Intermediate result generated by contract mechanism is encourage, but the coordination of price to resources and information need improved rules to constrain the behaviour of subject, so the contract mechanism alone cannot work, without the basic guarantee of bureaucratic mechanism; Although the contract mechanism is dominant, it is inseparable with other mechanisms as well. Of course, if there is a long-term network mechanism social trust, it will greatly reduce the transaction costs of social capital based on trust. So relying on perfect security rules, supported by benign social capital, contract mechanism can fully play its role in encourage. Pan-Pearl River water pollution control reflects the obvious network mechanism governance model. Networking mechanism played a leading role under this model, with contribution from other mechanisms as well. First, the long-term cooperation mechanism established by joint participation is precedent political condition of Pan-PRD cooperation governance. Based on this rules, local government in the same region fully achieve the exchange of information and sources through holding Environmental Joint Meeting, establishing topic working group and environmental protection exchanges, and briefing mechanism; at the same time, water pollution communication and coordination mechanism, pollution compensation mechanism, funding sharing mechanism and benefit distribution Mechanism constructed jointly, are  typical contract mechanism, which help to achieve incentive compatibility and enhance the  cooperation governance power. These measures solved the problem of information asymmetry and incentive incompatibility in "Prisoner's Dilemma". Ultimately, taking "voluntary participation, equality and openness, complementary advantages, mutual benefit and win-win" as the tone, Pan-Pearl River Delta water pollution control in shared network-based cooperative governance model has achieved good results.

After the comparative analysis of three representative cases, the paper believes the effectiveness of environmental governance is related to cross-border cooperation governance model selection. For the government, if pursue the sustainable governance, contract dominant cooperation governance model is superior to the other two models. If solve the urgent problem of cross-border pollution, bureaucracy dominant cooperative governance model is superior to the other two models. The conclusion is that governor should study how to select the most efficient governance model when facing specific public issue, from the character of cooperation governance and public issues.

Fan Yong-Mao, associate director of Public Policy and Public Finance Institute of SPAP of Renmin University of China, master tutor, he received a Master degree of Public Administration at Dalhousie University in Canada, a doctor degree in political science at Northern Illinois University, USA, a former researcher of Education Humanities and social science Ministry research basement of China public management Research Centre at Zhongshan University, executive editor of Public Administration Review, a member of post-doctor Friendship Association of Guangdong Province, Shenzhen Municipal Finance Committee planning expert , and guest commentator at the "People's Daily", China Radio international, Chinese network, Xinhua, Southern TV, TV and other media in Hong Kong. Now he is the cadre in the 8th Xinjiang Supporting Program of Central Organization Department, and vice dean of School of Management of Xinjiang Agricultural University.